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COOPERATION  IN  THE  SHADOW  OF  WTO  LAW:    
WHY  LITIGATE  WHEN  YOU  CAN  NEGOTIATE  
  
Arlo  Poletti*,  Dirk  De  Bièvre**,  J.  Tyson  Chatagnier***        Abstract    In   the  current  multilateral   trade  regime,  members  often  negotiate  under   the  shadow  of  WTO  law.  This  article  develops  a  formal  explanation  of  the  way  in  which  the  credible  threat  to  resort  to  and  the  actual  use  of  WTO  litigation  can  influence  multilateral  trade  negotiations.  We  contend  that  the   ability   to   impose   costs   on   a   defendant   by   way   of   litigation   increases   the   complainant’s  bargaining   power,   opening   a   bargaining   window   and      ultimately   increasing   the   chances   for  cooperation  in  multilateral  trade  negotiations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  complainant’s  preference  for  loss-­‐mitigation   over   gains   from   retaliation   and   its   expectations   about   the   likelihood   that   the  defendant   will   not   comply   with   an   adverse   ruling   can   augment   the   defendant’s   bargaining  leverage.   Thus,   contrary   to   conventional   wisdom,   increased   enforcement   does   not   necessarily  make  actors  shy  away   from  further  cooperation,  although  the  credibility  of   the  defendant’s  non-­‐compliant  threats  crucially  affects  the  location  of  any  potential  negotiated  agreement.  Empirically,  we  show  that  the  argument  can  account  for  how  Brazil,  a  potential  complainant,  and  the  EU  and  the  US,  two  potential  defendants,  approached  and  bargained  agricultural  negotiations  in  the  Doha  round.                                          
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1.    Introduction    With   the   establishment   of   the   World   Trade   Organization   (WTO),   a   lively   scholarly  debate  has  emerged  about  the  effect  of  more  judicialized  adjudication  of  trade  complaints,  in   comparison   with   the   GATT’s   political-­‐diplomatic   system   of   dispute   settlement.   The  strengthened  enforcement  mechanism  of  WTO  rules  means  that  member  states  can  expect  to   face   high   costs   if   they   breach   those   rules   (Zangl   2008).   The   dispute   settlement  mechanism   (DSM)   of   the   WTO   delegated   adjudication   to   an   independent   third   party  (panels   and   Appellate   Body)   and   strengthened   enforcement   by   introducing   a   credible  threat  of  multilaterally  authorized  sanctions  in  case  of  non-­‐compliance.  This  evolution  has  been   referred   to   as   the   legalization   or   judicialization   of   the   present   international   trade  regime.1    Scholars   have   inquired   into   how   judicialization   affects   the   trade-­‐related   interests   of  and   the   trade-­‐policy-­‐making   dynamics   among   domestic   actors   in   WTO   member   states  (key   economic   interest   groups   and   policymakers   alike)   in   two   ways.   One   strand   of  literature  analyzes  the  effects  of  judicialization  on  the  prospects  for  further  cooperation  in  the   WTO.   Some   authors   suggest   that   a   high   degree   of   bindingness   of   trade   rules   may  decrease  the  propensity  of  WTO  members   to  commit   to  new  agreements  (Goldstein  and  Martin  2000),  while  others  have  argued  in  the  opposite  direction  (De  Bièvre  2006;  Poletti  2011;  Rosendorff  2005).  A   second   strand   of   literature   focuses   on   the   politics   of   WTO   dispute   settlement,  investigating   why   states   decide   to   initiate   disputes   (Busch   et   al.   2009),   why   disputes  escalate   (Busch   2000;   Davis   2013;   Guzmann   and   Simmons   2002)   and   under   what  conditions   parties   comply   with  WTO   dispute   settlement   panels   decisions   (Bown   2004;  Goldstein  and  Steinberg  2008).    To   date,   surprisingly   little   effort   has   been   devoted   to   integrating   these   two   largely  separate   strands   of   literature.   Journalists’   accounts,   policy-­‐oriented   research,   and   even  scholarly  studies  on  the  Doha  round  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations  have  hinted  at  the  ‘shadow  of  WTO   law’   as   a   key   determinant   of   policy   preferences,   bargaining   strategies,  and   tactics   of   parties   prior   to   and   during   the  Doha   round.   For   instance,   several   studies  concur   that   the   expiration   of   the   ‘peace   clause’   of   the   Uruguay   Round   Agreement   on  Agriculture  (URAA)  and  the  subsequent  disputes  against  EU  and  US  agricultural  subsidies  strongly   influenced   the   Doha   round   negotiations   concerning   agriculture   (Poletti   2010;  Porterfield   2006;   Sumner   2005).   Similarly,   WTO   disputes   against   EU   precautionary-­‐principle-­‐based   regulations   influenced   negotiations   on   so-­‐called   trade-­‐and-­‐environment  issues  (Kelemen  2010;  Poletti  and  Sicurelli  2012,  Skogstad  2003).  Despite  this  evidence,  to  our   knowledge,   no   systematic,   theoretically-­‐informed   study   has   yet   been   produced   to  investigate  whether,  under  what  conditions,  and  how  the  decision  by  one  WTO  member  to  initiate  a  legal  dispute  against  another  affects  cooperative  dynamics  in  the  context  of  WTO  negotiations.   Although  Busch   and  Reinhardt   (2000)   have   shown  how  uncertainty   about  each  sides’  preference   in  a  WTO  dispute  might  encourage  settlement  before   the  dispute  escalates,  the  question  of  how  the  threat  (or  use)  of  litigation  affects  bargaining  dynamics  in  multilateral  trade  negotiations  remains  unaddressed.    This  analysis  offers  a  systematic  investigation  of  the  causal  mechanisms  that  link  legal  vulnerability   in  the  WTO  (i.e.,   the  credible  threat   to  resort   to  and  the  actual  use  of  WTO  
                                                
1 While legalization is the most commonly used concept within this literature, we opt for the term judicialization 




litigation)  and  multilateral  trade  negotiations.  In  this  article,  we  seek  to  explain  why  and  under   what   conditions   the   initiation   of   a   WTO   dispute   while   multilateral   trade  negotiations  are  ongoing  may  make  successful  negotiations  more  likely.  More  specifically,  we   contend   that   legal   vulnerability   can   increase   the   set   of   feasible   agreements   for   both  sides,   relative   to   the   status   quo   ante,   thus   potentially   increasing   the   likelihood   of  cooperation   in  multilateral  negotiations.   It   is  obvious  why  a  member  state  challenged   in  WTO   litigation  would   have   an   interest   in   drowning   the   controversy   in   ongoing,   broad-­‐based,  multilateral  negotiations.  For  a  defendant,  shifting  the  issue  to  the  bargaining  table  of  multilateral   trade  negotiations  provides  opportunities   to  minimize  or  offset   the   likely  adjustment  costs  of  an  adverse  WTO  panel  ruling  (Poletti  2010).   It   is  much   less  obvious  why   the   complainant   in   such   a   dispute   would   acquiesce   to   the   defendant’s   strategy,  seeking  a  solution  to  the  controversy  through  multilateral  negotiations,  if  it  can  expect  to  win   (or   has   won)   such   a   case   in   WTO   litigation.   We   contend   that   while   the   ability   to  impose  costs  on  a  defendant  by  way  of   litigation   increases   the  complainant’s  bargaining  power,   the   complainant’s   preference   for   loss-­‐mitigation   over   gains   from   retaliation  augments   the   defendant’s   leverage.   The   balance   between   these   two   forces   opens   a  bargaining  window,  ultimately  increasing  the  chances  for  cooperation  in  multilateral  trade  negotiations.   The   complainant’s   increased  bargaining  power,   however,   is   conditional,   to  some  extent,  upon  a  belief  that  litigation  will  produce  a  compliant  response  on  the  part  of  the   defendant.   If   the   defendant   is   not   expected   to   comply,   then,   although   a   bargaining  window  will  still  exist,  the  complainant  will  be  able  to  extract  fewer  concessions  from  the  defendant.  Therefore,  our  argument  encompasses  two  potential  sources  of  variation:  the  existence   of   a   judicialization   regime,   and   the   likelihood   that   the   defendant  will   comply  with   an   adverse   ruling.   The   first   affects   whether   a   bargaining   range   exists,   while   the  second  helps  to  explain  where  on  that  range  a  potential  agreement  is  likely  to  be  located.  In   line   with   standard   international   political   economy   approaches,   the   assumption  underpinning   our   analysis   is   that   governments’   choices   over   trade   policies   can   be  conceived  of  as  a  function  of  the  preferences  and  political  pressures  emanating  from  key  economic  interest  groups  defined  by  society  as  a  result  of  a  rational  calculation  about  the  expected   distributional   consequences   of   cooperative   agreements.   We   thus   conceive   of  political   actors   not   as   advocates   of   a   specific   trade   policy   independent   of   constituency  demands,   but   rather   as   office-­‐maintainers   and   -­‐seekers,   avoiding   the   mobilization   of  political  enemies  (Frieden  1991;  Milner  1988;  Rogowski  1989).    With   this   piece,   we   contribute   to   the   debate   on   the   institutional   underpinnings   of  cooperation   in   the   international   trade   regime   in   different   ways.   Contrary   to   earlier  expectations   (Goldstein   and   Martin   2000),   we   show   how   increased   bindingness   of  international   trade   rules  may   ignite   a   positive   dynamic   of   cooperation.   In   addition,   we  complement   the   findings  of   the   literature  on   the  politics  of  dispute   settlement,   showing  that   retaliation   backed   by   law   not   only   can   increase   the   likelihood   of   negotiated  settlement  during   the   consultation  phase  of  WTO   litigation   (Busch  and  Reinhardt  2000;  Reinhardt   2001),   but   can   also   increase   the   chances   of   cooperation   in  multilateral   trade  rounds.    The   paper   proceeds   as   follows.   First,   we   review   the   literature   that   deals   with   the  question  of  how  the  WTO  affects  the  domestic  politics  of  trade  policymaking.  Second,  we  develop   an   argument   that   shows   why   judicialization   can   increase   domestic   actors’  propensity   to   conduct   issue   linkage   negotiations   in   the   WTO.   Third,   we   subject   our  argument   to   empirical   scrutiny   by   carrying   out   an   in-­‐depth   qualitative   analysis   of   how  potential   defendants   (the   European   Union   (EU)   and   the   United   States   (US))   and   a  
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potential   complainant   (Brazil)   in   WTO   disputes,   approached   agricultural   trade  negotiations  in  the  Doha  Round.  In  the  final  section,  we  draw  our  conclusions.      
2.    Legal  vulnerability  and  the  domestic  politics  of  trade  policy  making    The  existing  literature  on  how  WTO  judicialization  affects  cooperation  concentrates  on  the  fundamental   question   of   how   such   an   institutional   innovation   affects   a   member   state’s  preferences  when  deciding  whether   to   expand   the   range   of   rules   to  which   they   should   be  committed.   It   has   been   convincingly   argued   that   stronger   enforcement   of   rules   can  make  further   cooperation   less   likely   in   the  WTO   (Goldstein   and   Martin   2000).   While   increased  enforceability   makes   agreements  more   credible,   it   also  makes   them  more   tightly   binding.  Because  governments  value   institutional   flexibility  as  a   tool   to  deal  with   the  uncertainty  of  future  economic  interactions,  it  is  plausible  to  expect  them  to  believe  that  the  costs  of  signing  such   agreements   outweigh   the   benefits.   This   argument   is   consistent   with   and   largely  overlaps   the   scholarly   research   focusing   on   the   relationship   between   uncertainty   and   the  design  of  international  institutions  (Downs  and  Rocke  1995,  Koremenos  et  al.  2001).  These   analyses   however,   focus   only   on   how   prospective   enforceability   of   future  agreements  can  affect  an  actor’s  propensity  to  commit  to  such  agreements.  In  the  context  of  the  WTO,  this  perspective  essentially  questions  whether  member  states  will  be  prone  to  widen  organizational  jurisdiction  to  a  host  of  new  issue  areas.    However,   WTO   member   states   not   only   face   a   choice   between   committing   or   not  committing   to   new   binding   agreements.   They   are   already   bound   by   a   wide   array   of  agreements   within   the   organization.   This   means   that   member   states   may   happen   to  negotiate   under   the   shadow   of  WTO   law:   they  may   engage   in  multilateral   negotiations  while  foreign  partners  could  (and  sometimes  do)  challenge  them  through  WTO  litigation.  Thus,  whenever  such  negotiations  touch  upon  issues  already  governed  by  organizational  law,   member   states   may   face   a   choice   between   litigation   and   negotiation   if   trading  partners   initiate   legal   disputes   against   them   while   negotiations   are   ongoing.   But   how  exactly   does   litigation   affect   multilateral   trade   negotiations?   Does   it   increase   the  bargaining   space   in   negotiations   or   does   it   create   new   obstacles   on   the   path   towards  agreement?  And  when  does  it  empower  a  complainant?  In   the   next   sections   we   make   two   arguments.   First,   during   multilateral   trade  negotiations,   when   a   member   state   has   the   option   to   challenge   another   (successfully)  through   WTO   dispute-­‐resolution   mechanisms,   the   set   of   feasible   agreements   for   both  sides  may   increase   and   overlap,   strengthening   the   chance   of   agreement   relative   to   the  
status   quo   ante.   Second,   the   efficacy   of   this   mechanism   is   dependent   in   part   upon   the  willingness  of  the  defendant  to  comply  with  a  ruling  in  the  complainant’s  favor.    Below,  we   present   a   simple   game   in  which   two   states   bargain   over   the   reduction   of  trade-­‐distorting   measures   in   the   shadow   of   judicialization.   Negotiations   on   the  liberalization   of   international   trade   in   the   trade   regime   take   the   shape   of   exchanges   of  reciprocal  market   access   concessions   between   trading   partners.   Exporters   in   one  WTO  member   state   mobilize,   demanding   that   their   government   seek   the   removal   of   trade-­‐distorting  measures,  which  provide   import-­‐competing  producers   in   the  other   state  with  protection   from   foreign   competition.  Whether   an   agreement  will   be   struck   depends   on  whether   the   sets   of   feasible   agreements   for   the   parties   involved   in   the   negotiations  overlap  at  a  particular  point  in  time.    Since  the  introduction  of  a  quasi-­‐judicial  mechanism  of   dispute   resolution   in   the   trade   regime,   however,   governments   possess   an   additional  tool   to   target   trade-­‐distorting  measures   that   are   incompatible  with  WTO   rules.   Indeed,  
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member  states  that  enjoy  the  benefits  of  protectionism  through  legally  vulnerable  policy  tools   can  no   longer   consider   the   status  quo  as  a   cost-­‐free   strategy,   as   those   seeking   the  removal  of  WTO-­‐incompatible  policies  can  impose  adjustment  costs  on  them  through  the  imposition   of   retaliatory   measures,   following   authorization   from   a   WTO   dispute  settlement  or  Appellate  Body  ruling.    As  the  analysis    of  the  following  model  shows,  when  a   WTO   member   successfully   takes   legal   action   (or   can   credibly   threaten   to   take   legal  action)  against  another  member  state,  it  can  significantly  affect  negotiations  by  increasing  the  set  of  feasible  agreements  both  sides  are  ready  to  accept.  However,  this  mechanism  is  mediated  by  the  complainant’s  belief   that   the  defendant  will  eventually  comply  with  the  ruling.  It  is  important  to  note  that  our  argument  holds  only  when  the  two  sides  involved  in  a  dispute  are  in  an  interdependent  trading  relationship.  This  is  a  scope  condition  for  our  proposed  mechanism.  Only  when  this  condition  is  satisfied  will  each  side  value  the  other’s  market   as   a   destination   and   therefore   be   in   a   position   to   pursue   or   threaten   to   pursue  policies  that  can  generate  losses  for  the  other  side.    
2.1 Model  Setup  Suppose  that  during  multilateral  trade  negotiations,  a  WTO  member  state  (A)  demands  concessions   from   a   trading   partner   (B),   who   has   implemented   some   trade-­‐distorting  measure.  Let  the  present  size  of  the  measure  be  normalized  to  one  and  let  zero  represent  full  compliance  with  A’s  demand,  so  that  any  number  on  the  open  interval  between  zero  and   one   represents   a   correspondingly   reduced   barrier   size.   Assume   that  A   and  B   have  linear,  monotonic,  and  competing  preferences  over  the  trade  barrier,  such  that  B’s  utility  is  strictly  increasing  in  barrier  size,  while  A’s  is  strictly  decreasing.  Suppose  further  that  B  can   be   of   two   types:   the   non-­‐compliant   type   (BNC),   for   whom   there   is   some   additional  penalty  to  be  paid  for  full  compliance,  and  the  compliant  type  (BC),  for  whom  there  is  no  additional   cost.   Let   this   additional   cost   for   the   non-­‐compliant   type   be   represented   by  𝜖 > 0.  State  B’s  type  is  the  result  of  an  initial  draw  by  nature,  such  that  B  is  compliant  with  probability   0 < 𝑝 < 1   and   non-­‐compliant   with   complementary   probability.   This   type   is  private  information  for  B,  but  the  distribution  of  types  is  common  knowledge.  State  A’s  beliefs  about  state  B’s  type  are  potentially  based  on  two  factors.  First,  they  are  affected  by  the  prior  probability  that  state  B  is  compliant.  Empirically,  this  probability  is  a  function   of   the   state’s   ties   to   import-­‐competing   industries,   who   will   attempt   to   punish  governments  that  concede  too  much.  A  government  that  is  able  to  preserve  some  or  all  of  its  trade  violation  will  not  face  any  punishment  from  import-­‐competitors  while,  one  that  completely   concedes   to   the   opponent’s   demands,   without   getting   anything   in   return,   is  seen  as  selling  out   the  domestic   industry,  and  pays  a  cost  premium.  Second,  state  A  will  take  into  account  any  previous  observations  of  state  B’s  behavior.  In  cases  in  which  A  has  previously  observed  B  complying  or  not  complying  with  judicial  rulings,  it  will  incorporate  this  information  according  to  Bayesian  principles.  The  game  is  depicted  in  Figure  1,  below.  It  begins  with  Nature  drawing  B’s  type,  following  a  demand  by  A   that  B  remove  its  trade-­‐distorting  policy.  State  B  can  then  either  concede  to  the  demand  or  refuse  to  concede.  If  it  concedes,  then  the  game  ends  and  both  states  receive  payoffs  according  to  their  valuation  of  the  full  concessions  outcome.  If  B  does  not  concede,  A  can  either  accept  this  decision  or  threaten  to  litigate.2  If  it  accepts,  then  the  game  ends,  and  both  states  receive  the  status  quo  payoff.  If  A  threatens  to  litigate,  then  B  can  choose  to  refuse  to   comply   completely,   or   it   can   offer   a   negotiated   settlement.   If   B   refuses,   then   litigation  
                                                
2 We assume here that the complainant (here, state A) wins litigation with certainty, and that this outcome is common 
knowledge. As discussed later, relaxing this assumption does not meaningfully change our substantive results. 
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occurs  and  A  acquires  the  ability  to  impose  retaliatory  measures  against  B.  These  measures  will  be  equal  in  magnitude  to  the  initial  trade-­‐distorting  measure  imposed  by  B,  and  will  thus  harm   state  B’s   exporters   to   the   same   degree   that   the   initial   measure   benefits  B’s   import-­‐competing   industries.   Therefore,   it   will   cancel   out   any   gains   from   the   initial   measure.  Retaliation  may  also  provide  a  similar  benefit  to  A’s  domestic   industries.  However,  because  
A’s   import-­‐competing   industries   did   not   mobilize   for   the   benefit,   the   ultimate   value   of  retaliation  for  the  state  is  reduced  by  some  factor,  𝛼 ∈ (0, 1).  If  B  chooses  to  negotiate,  then  it  makes   a   proposal   to  A,   of  𝑁 ∈ [0, 1],   where  N   represents   the   size   of   the   reduction   of   the  measure.   State  A   can   choose   to  accept  or   reject   this  offer.   If   it   accepts,   then   the   two  states  agree   to   reduce   the   trade-­‐distorting   measure   to   N.   We   assume   that   the   round   ends  successfully,  that  the  settlement  is  implemented,  and  that  both  states  receive  their  respective  payoffs  from  negotiation.  If  it  rejects,  then  A  proceeds  with  litigation.  Again,  we  assume  that  if  litigation  occurs,  the  complainant  (A)  wins  with  certainty.3  Given  this  outcome,  B  can  comply  with  the  judgment  or  it  can  opt  not  to  comply.  If  it  complies,  then  the  two  states  receive  the  full   compliance   payoff.   If   it   refuses   to   comply,   then   A   is   authorized   to   retaliate,   and   can  choose   whether   or   not   to   do   so.   If   it   does,   then   the   states   receive   the   retaliation   payoff;  otherwise,  they  receive  the  status  quo  payoff.     
Figure  1  –  Bargaining  in  the  shadow  of  WTO  litigation  
  
                                                
3 Both assumptions above can easily be relaxed by assigning some exogenous probability to the outcomes. Doing 
so will not affect the substantive results of the model, but rather will alter B’s optimal negotiated offer (N*). 
Uncertainty about the outcome of litigation increases the bargaining power of state B and reduces the value of 
N*. Uncertainty about the end of the negotiating round makes litigation more attractive, increasing the 
bargaining power of A, and increasing the optimal N*. Indeed, as the probability that the round ends successfully 
approaches 1, the incentive to negotiate disappears. In such a case, state A would always prefer to litigate, as 
even a successful negotiation, if not implementable, would result in a status quo outcome. 
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Players’   preferences   over   outcomes   are   as   follows.   For   A,   the   ideal   outcome   is   full  compliance  by  B,  which  it  prefers  to  retaliation,  wherein  it  will  recover  only  𝛼  of  the  cost.  Retaliation  is  in  turn  is  preferred  to  the  status  quo.  Formally,  𝑢! 𝐹𝐶 > 𝑢! 𝑅 > 𝑢!(𝑆𝑄).  
A’s  preference  with  respect  to  a  negotiated  settlement  depends  on  where  the  settlement  falls.  It  prefers  offers  such  that  N  is  low  to  those  for  which  it  is  high.  B,  by  contrast,  most  prefers  the  status  quo,  as  it  continues  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  its  trade-­‐distorting  measure.  It  prefers   this   to   retaliation  by  A,  which  will   eliminate  any   such  benefits.  The  compliant  type,  BC,   is   indifferent   between   retaliation   and   full   compliance;   the   non-­‐compliant   type,  
BNC,   strictly   prefers   retaliation   to   compliance.   Formally,   𝑢!! 𝑆𝑄 > 𝑢!! 𝑅 = 𝑢!!(𝐹𝐶)  and  𝑢!!" 𝑆𝑄 > 𝑢!!" 𝑅 > 𝑢!!"(𝐹𝐶).    Like  A,  B’s  preference  with  respect  to  N  depend  on  its  value.  It  prefers  larger  values  of  N  to  smaller  ones.    This   is   a   game   of   incomplete   information,   requiring   a   Perfect   Bayesian   Equilibrium  (PBE).   It   can   be   solved   using   backward   induction.  We  make   the   assumption   that,  when  indifferent,   a   state   has   a   preference   for   the   more   peaceful   choice   (i.e.,   concession,  negotiation,   compliance,   or   non-­‐retaliation),   and   that   in   the   case   of   off-­‐the-­‐equilibrium-­‐path   (OTEP)   play,   A   believes   B   to   be   of   the   compliant   type.   We   discuss   the   latter  assumption  below.    
2.2 Analysis  Given  our  assumptions,  players  have  dominant  strategies  at  each  node,  and  thus  there  is   a   unique   pure   strategy   equilibrium.   Moreover,   there   exist   no   non-­‐degenerate   mixed  strategy  equilibria.  Beginning  from  the  final  node,  players’  equilibrium  strategies  follow.  If  litigation   has   proceeded   and   B   refuses   to   comply,   A   strictly   prefers   retaliation,   which  allows  it  to  recoup  some  of  the  costs  of  the  barriers,  to  non-­‐retaliation.  Given  this  strategy,  when   faced   with   an   adverse   judgment,   BC  will   prefer   to   comply,   while   BNC  will   refuse,  strictly  preferring  retaliation  to  compliance.  Because  A  is  unaware  of  what  type  of  B   it   is  facing,   its  decision   following  a  negotiated  offer  by  B  will  be  a   function  of   the  probability  that  B  is  compliant  (p).  In  particular,  it  will  accept  any  proposed  barrier  level,  𝑁 ≤ 𝑝(0) +(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑝),  and  reject  any  larger  proposal.  Given  these  preferences  and  A’s  beliefs,  the  optimal   offer   for   both   types   of   state  B  will   be   at   state  A’s   reservation   value,  𝑁∗ = (1 −𝛼)(1 − 𝑝).4  Because  this  value  must  be  strictly  positive,  both  types  will  prefer  offering  𝑁∗  to  refusing  to  negotiate.  The  feasible  equilibrium  values  of  𝑁∗  span  the  open  unit  interval.  Because  𝑁∗ < 1  in  equilibrium,  A  will  prefer  (the  threat  of)  litigation  to  acceptance  of  the  status  quo.  Finally,  given  the  initial  choice  between  concession  and  refusal  to  concede,  the  fact  that  𝑁∗ > 0  will   lead  both  types  of  B  to  refuse  concessions  initially.  The  equilibrium  beliefs   for   A   are   simply   that   B   is   of   type   BC   with   probability   p,   and   of   type   BNC   with  probability  1 − 𝑝.  Because  both  types  behave  similarly  on  the  equilibrium  path,  state  A’s  prior   and  posterior  beliefs   are   equivalent   in   equilibrium.  Given   any  off-­‐the-­‐equilibrium-­‐path  play  by  B,  A  believes  B  to  be  of  type  BC  with  probability  one.  The  equilibrium  outcome  in  this  game  is  a  negotiated  proposal  by  B,  𝑁∗ = (1 − 𝛼)(1 −𝑝),  which  is  accepted  by  A.  The  equilibrium  offer  depends  on  the  distribution  of  types  of  B  and   on   the   benefit   to   A   of   retaliatory   barriers.   As   the   likelihood   that   B   is   of   the   non-­‐compliant   type   increases,   the  equilibrium  value  of  𝑁∗  also   increases,   leading   to  a   larger  
                                                
4 This is the only point at which A’s beliefs about OTEP behavior are payoff relevant. Because A’s decision to 
accept or reject B’s offer is a function of A’s posterior belief about B’s type (𝑝), if an OTEP proposal leads A to 
believe that 𝑝 < 𝑝, then both types of state B will have an incentive to deviate toward 𝑁 = (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝑝), and 
no equilibrium can be sustained. Thus, an equilibrium only exists if A’s posterior belief about the probability that 
B is compliant is at least p. We choose 𝑝 = 1 for simplicity. 
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portion   of   the   trade-­‐distorting   measure   remaining   in   effect.   On   the   other   hand,   as   the  benefit   from   retaliating   grows,   the   equilibrium   value   of   𝑁∗   decreases,   leading   to   a  reduction   in   the  agreed-­‐upon   trade  distortion   level.   In  all   cases,  however,  negotiation   is  expected  to  occur,  with  the  states’  beliefs  about  the  outcome  of   litigation  influencing  the  agreed-­‐upon  settlement.      
Figure  2  –  Bargaining  in  the  absence  of  legal  vulnerability  
  The   driving   force   in   the  model   above   is   the   authorization   to   retaliate   (or,   perhaps  more   importantly,   the   credible   threat   of   retaliation)   that   A   receives   from   successful  litigation.   We   can   contrast   this   to   the   situation   depicted   in   Figure   2,   in   which   trade  negotiations  do  not  occur  under  the  shadow  of  litigation  In  such  a  scenario,  A  lacks  any  sort  of  stick  with  which  to  coerce  B   into  reducing  its  trade  distortion.  Its  only  option  is  simply  to  demand  that  B  comply  with  WTO  rules.  If  state  B  agrees,  then  it  receives  the  concession  outcome,  and  if   it  does  not,  the  status  quo  remains  in  place.  Faced  with  the  simple   choice  between   reducing  and  maintaining   its   level  of  protection,  with  no  other  consequences,   both   types   of   state   B   would   prefer   to   keep   the   measure   intact.  Judicialization,   therefore,   provides   A   with   an   important   weapon   in   multilateral  negotiations   that  can   induce  cooperation  (if  not   full   compliance)  without  ever  actually  being  used.5      
2.3 Empirically  observable  implications  The   argument   presented   so   far   captures   how   litigation   in   the  WTO   affects   ongoing  multilateral   trade  negotiations.  Before  proceeding   to   the  empirical  analysis  we   turn   to  identifying  a  number  of  observable  empirical  implications  of  our  theory.  One  of  the  key  premises  of  our  model  is  that  a  WTO  member  (or  group  of  members)  is  in  a  position  to  threaten   (credibly)   the   imposition   of   concentrated   costs   on   another  WTO  member   by  initiating  a  complaint  at  the  WTO,  and  thereby  threaten  to  impose  retaliatory  measures  in   the   case   of   non-­‐compliance.   Thus,   our   implications   are   conditioned   on   this  assumption.   First,   we   expect   to   observe   that   litigation   is   a   key   factor   influencing   the  
                                                
5 While this paper concentrates exclusively on multilateral negotiations, there is no reason that the mechanism 
outlined above could not have an effect on bilateral negotiations as well. However, because multilateral 
negotiations make it easier for states to overcome the demands of import-competing groups (Davis 2004), the 
complainant’s bargaining leverage should increase to a greater degree in a multilateral situation, relative to a 
bilateral one. Thus, our mechanism should be more effective when negotiations occur in a multilateral context. 
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strategic   calculus   of  WTO  member   states   involved   in   the  dispute.   This  means   that  we  should  be  able  to  trace  the  (credible)  threat  or   initiation  of  a  dispute  to  an   increase   in  the  set  of  feasible  agreements  between  the  two  disputants  in  the  context  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations  relative  to  the  status  quo  ante.  When  a  state  cannot  credibly  threaten  to   litigate,   the   bargaining   window   will   not   expand,   and   thus   we   expect   a   negotiated  settlement  to  be  unlikely.  Second,  the  location  of  the  agreement  (if  one  exists),  should  be  a  function  of  the  credibility  of  the  first  state’s  threat  to  litigate  and  the  probability  that  the   second   state   is   of   the   compliant   type.   A   state   should   be   able   to   extract   greater  concessions  through  negotiations  when  its  threats  are  believed  and  when  its  opponent  is   likely   to   comply   with   an   adverse   ruling.   Empirically,   factors   such   as   the   level   of  organization  of   various  domestic   groups  will   cause   the   likelihood   that   a   given   state   is  compliant  to  vary  across  issue  areas.  However,  an  opponent  should  still  be  able  to  infer  something   about   a   state’s   likelihood   of   compliance   on   a   given   issue   if   it   observes   it  complying   (or   not   complying)   in   previous   instances.   Third,   our   argument   does   not  suggest  that  litigation  affects  the  likelihood  of  success  for  multilateral  trade  negotiations.  Our   analysis   is   limited   to   the   analysis   of   how   litigation   affects   the   likelihood   of  agreement   between   the   two   sides   involved   in   the   dispute.   For   this   agreement   to   be  implemented,  the  dyad’s  overlapping  set  of  feasible  agreements  would  have  to  intersect  with  the  win-­‐set  of  all  other  participants  –  a  negotiation  outcome  analysis  that  is  beyond  the   scope   of   this   paper.   Thus,   we   are   more   interested   in   the   results   of   dyadic  negotiations  than  in  outcomes  per  se.    
3.    Agricultural  trade  liberalization  in  the  shadow  of  WTO  law    We  demonstrate   the  empirical  plausibility  of  our   theoretical  argument  by  analyzing  the   interactions  between  one  potential   (and  sometimes  actual)  complainant,  Brazil,  on  the   one   hand   and   two   potential   defendants,   the   European  Union   (EU)   and   the  United  States   (US),   on   the   other.   We   examine   how   these   interactions   affected   bargaining  dynamics   on   agricultural   trade   liberalization   in   the   Doha   round.   Both   cases  meet   the  scope   conditions   of   our   argument,   as   they   concern  pairs   of  WTO  members  with   large  and  attractive  markets  in  a  position  of  trade  interdependence,  a  necessary  condition  for  a  potential  defendant  to  worry  about  the  threat  of  retaliation  by  a  potential  complainant.  One   attractive   feature   about   the   cases   that  we   investigate   is   temporal   in   nature.   Both  cases   occurred   around   the   time   that   litigation   became   an   option   for  WTO   disputants,  providing  us  with  important  variation  within  cases.  Therefore,  we  are  able  to  trace  how  states’   behaviors   evolved   in   response   to   changes   in   the   value   of   one   of   our   key  explanatory  factors.  In  addition,  the  two  cases  display  significant  variation  with  respect  to   the   second   independent   variable,   namely   the   defendant’s   expected   likelihood   of  compliance.  In  both  instances,  the  message  of  a  credible  threat  to  resort  to  the  DSM  was  conveyed  to  the  potential  target  and  the  opposing  state  could  reasonably  expect  to  lose  the  case.  However,  while   the  EU’s  behavior  signaled  to  Brazil   that   it  was   likely   to  be  a  compliant   type,   the  actions   taken  by   the  US  demonstrated  a   reluctance   to   comply.  We  show  that  these  differences  significantly  affected  the  outcomes  in  the  respective  cases.      
3.1 Agricultural  negotiations  and  the  pending  expiration  of  the  peace  clause:  the  EU  and  Brazil  The  Uruguay  Agreement  on  Agriculture  (URAA)  bound  WTO  members  to  a  set  of  clear  commitments   limiting   export   subsidies   and   domestic   support,   and   ensuring   market  access.   The   quantitative   impact   of   market-­‐access-­‐enhancing   tariff   reductions   in   the  
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URAA  on  agricultural   trade  was  marginal  because   the  cuts   in   import   tariffs   took  place  from  a  base  value  that  was  frequently  inflated  to  high  levels  –  a  practice  known  as  ‘dirty  tariffication’   (Tangermann   1999).   In   addition,   domestic   support   policies   of   major  developed   countries   were   required   to   make   only   minor   changes   to   bring   them   in  conformity  with  the  rules  of  the  agreement  (Josling  1998).  Yet,  the  agreement  contained  the  seeds  for  deeper  trade   liberalization  to  be  obtained  in   future  negotiations.  First,   in  order   to   meet   the   concerns   of   those   WTO   members   that   were   aware   of   the   limited  potential   for  agricultural   trade   liberalization  of  the  URAA,  the  text   included  a  so-­‐called  ‘built-­‐in   agenda’   (Article   20)   mandating   WTO   members   start   a   new   round   of  negotiations   on   agriculture   by   the   end   of   1999.   Second,   the   agreement   contained   an  important  provision,   the   so-­‐called   ‘peace   clause’   (Art.   13),  which  granted   immunity   to  countries  against  which  legal  action  could  be  initiated  on  the  basis  of  the  provisions  of  Agreement   on   Subsidies   and   Countervailing   Measures   (SCM).   This   WTO   agreement  disciplined  the  use  of  subsidies  and  regulated  the  actions  countries  could  take  to  counter  the   effects   of   subsidies.   In   essence,   the   ‘peace   clause’   protected   domestic   and   export  subsidies  programs  actionable  on  the  basis  of  the  SCM  agreement  until  the  end  of  2003,  provided  that  states  complied  with  the  reduction  commitments  contained  in  the  URAA.6  The  expiration  of  the  peace  clause  at  the  end  of  2003  would  open  up  the  possibility  for  potential   complainant   WTO   members   to   challenge   agricultural   domestic   and   export  subsidies  through  the  DSM  (Steinberg  and  Josling  2003;  Swinbank  1999).    As   middle-­‐income   agricultural   exporting   countries   such   as   Brazil   would   reap   the  largest  share  of  the  benefits  arising  from  further  agricultural  trade  liberalization  (OECD  2005),   it   is   unsurprising   that   in   the   late   1990s   by   groups   representing   agricultural  interests   organized   intense   lobbying   efforts   to   push   for   further   agricultural   trade  liberalization,   particularly   to   increase   their  market   access   opportunities   in   the  highly-­‐protected   markets   of   developed   high-­‐income   countries,   such   as   the   EU   and   the   US  (Cairns  Group  Farm  Leaders  1998,  1999a,  2000).    As  our  model   suggests,   the  prospect  of   the  peace   clause   expiration  was  deemed  by  both  relevant  interest  groups  and  policy  makers  to  provide  Brazil  with  an  effective  tool  to  extract  concessions  in  the  negotiating  game.  Although  the  threat  to  resort  to  the  DSM  after   2003   was   certainly   a   powerful   tool   in   the   hands   of   Brazilian   policymakers,   it  offered  no  certainty  that  Brazilian  agricultural  exporters  would  be  better  off.  As  reform  of  agricultural  policy  reform  was  known  to  be  particularly  difficult  to  achieve  in  the  EU    (Swinnen   2008),   the   possibility   that   non-­‐compliance   would   follow   an   adverse   WTO  ruling   was   a   scenario   that   needed   to   be   contemplated.   Therefore,   Brazil   opted   for   a  constructive  engagement  in  negotiations,  while  maintaining  a  credible  threat  to  resort  to  litigation.   In   the   period   preceding   the   launch   of   the   Doha   Round   private   sector  representatives   and   policymakers   in   Brazil   combined   calls   for   an   ambitious   agenda  aimed  at  the  elimination  of  all  trade-­‐distorting  subsidies  and  a  substantial  improvement  in  market   access,  with   an   explicit   reference   to   the   prospect   that   the   expiration   of   the  peace   clause   would   eliminate   all   constraints   against   the   use   of   the   DSM   to   challenge  developed   countries   (Cairns   Group   2000a,   2000b;   Cairns   Group   Farm   Leaders   2001;  Cotta  2001;  Ragawan  2001).    As   the   largest  provider  of   trade-­‐distorting  agricultural   subsidies,   the  EU  was  one  of  the  main  targets  of  those  potential  complainants.  Organizations  representing  European  
                                                
6 The peace clause (Art. 13 of the URAA) relates only to the domestic subsidy provisions listed in Annex 2 (the 
Green Box) and Article 6 (covering, inter alia, Blue and Amber Box payments) and to the export subsidy 
payments detailed in Part V of the Agreement. 
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farmers’  interests,  as  well  as  public  decision  makers  in  DG  Agriculture,  knew  that  these  domestic   policies   were   likely   to   be   deemed  WTO   incompatible   by   an   eventual   ruling  following  a  dispute  in  the  WTO.7  It  is  estimated  that  in  the  late  1990s  roughly  45%  of  the  EU’s   producers   support   estimate   (PSE)8   was   vulnerable   to   legal   challenges   (Poletti  2010).  As  was  noted  at  the  time,  compliance  with  a  succession  of  hostile  panel  reports  following   the   expiration   of   the   peace   clause   might   lead   to   a   death   of   the   European  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  by  a  thousand  cuts  (Swinbank,  1999,  p.  45).    The  position  of  legal  vulnerability  was  among  the  reasons  why  European  farmers  and  EU  policy  makers   aligned   in   support   of   the   strategy   of   comprehensive  negotiations   in  the  Doha   round.   This   type   of   negotiations   appealed   to   these   actors,   as   trade-­‐off   deals  increased   the   likelihood   of   a   compromise   entailing   a   fewer   agricultural   concessions  (Agra  Europe  2  November  2001;  Brittan  1999;  COPA-­‐COGECA  1999a,  1999b).9    When  a  deal  on  the  agenda  of  the  new  round  of  trade  negotiations  was  reached  at  the  Doha   WTO   Ministerial   meeting   in   November   2001,   agricultural   negotiations   became  part  of  a  single  undertaking,  scheduled  to  end  by   January  2005.  Although  the  text  was  understandably  vague  and  ambiguous,  it  identified  the  parameters  within  which  a  future  agreement  would  have  to  be  based:  improvements  in  market  access,  reductions  of  (with  plans   to  phase   out)   all   forms  of   export   subsidies,   and   substantial   reductions   in   trade-­‐distorting  domestic  support  (WTO  2001).    In  the  first  phase  of  negotiations  the  two  sides  took  very  different  positions.  The  first  proposal  tabled  by  the  EU  in  February  2003  was  defensive  and  sought  to  keep  intact  the  structure   of   URAA   (WTO   2003),   whereas   the   position   adopted   by   Brazil   and   other  members  of   the  Cairns  Group  was  more  aggressive,   including   requests   for   a   complete  phasing  out  of  export  subsidies  by  a  three-­‐year  implementation  period,  the  elimination  of  blue  and  amber  box  direct  payments  by  a  five-­‐year  implementation  period,  a  tighter  definition   of   green-­‐box   payments,   significant   tariff   cuts,   and   an   opposition   to   any  extension   of   the   peace   clause   (Cairns   Group   2000,   2000a,   2000b).   Yet,   the   two  developments   strictly   connected   to   the   EU’s   legal   vulnerability   contributed   to   a  softening  of  its  bargaining  position  and  to  a  partial  convergence  toward  the  positions  of  countries  such  as  Brazil.    First,  in  late  2002,  Brazil  (together  with  Australia  and  later  Thailand)  initiated  a  WTO  dispute   against   the   EC   sugar   regime,   arguing   that   the   EU   was   subsidizing   exports   in  excess   of   the   volume   and   expenditure   limits   set   down   in   the   Uruguay   Round   (WTO  2002).The  explicit  aim  of  the  dispute  was  not  simply  to  seek  a  favorable  WTO  ruling,  but  rather   to  communicate   to   the  EU  the  unfairness  of   its  agricultural  policies  and  Brazil’s  readiness  to  use  all  instruments  at  its  disposal  to  extract  concessions  in  the  Doha  round  (Camargo  2008).  By  the  summer  of  2003,  the  EU  realized  it  would  lose  the  case  (Ackrill  and  Kay  2009),  and  would  be  forced  to  comply  with  WTO  rules,  or  face  retaliation;  and  indeed,  in  both  2004  and  2005,  the  WTO  Appellate  Body  ruled  in  favor  of  Brazil  (WTO  2004,   2005).   As   Anania   and   Bureau   (2005:   548)   note,   by   proving   that   developing  countries  can  beat  the  main  players  in  the  WTO,  the  dispute  had  two  main  consequences  for   negotiations:   it   enhanced   the   bargaining   power   of   countries   such   as   Brazil   by  
                                                
7 Authors’ interview at COPA-COGECA, Brussels, 16 June 2010, and with DG Trade Official at the European 
Commission, Brussels, 22 February 2009.  
8 An indicator created to provide a summary measure of the producer subsidy that would be equivalent to all the 
forms of support provided to farmers including direct farm subsidies that may or may not encourage production 
domestically, as well as market price support provided by import tariffs and export subsidies 
9 Authors’ interview at COPA-COGECA, Brussels, 16 June 2010. 
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showing  they  could  obtain  significant  benefits  by  resorting  to  WTO  dispute  settlement  and,  in  turn,  weakened  the  position  of  countries  that  proved  vulnerable  to  the  disputes,  such  as  the  EU.    Second,  in  parallel  and  in  connection  to  these  developments,  the  EU  began  a  further  reform  of  CAP.  With  the  June  2003  agreement  on  the  Fischler  reforms,  the  structure  of  CAP   was   significantly   transformed   by   decoupling   most   direct   aid   from   production  requirements,  turning  the  largest  share  of  potentially  actionable  policy  instruments  into  WTO   compatible   ones,   while   reducing   support   provided   to   European   farmers   only  marginally  (Swinnen  2008).  Overcoming  the  likely  effects  of  the  expiration  of  the  peace  clause  was  clearly  a  key  factor  behind  this  reform,  as  it  had  the  most  pronounced  impact  on  the  likely  targets  of  legal  challenges  in  the  WTO  and  was  explicitly  aimed  at  enabling  the   EU   to   allocate   the   new   direct   payments   into   the   WTO-­‐compatible   green   box  (European  Commission  2002).10    These  developments  paved  the  way  for  a  gradual  convergence  of  positions  between  the  two  sides.  Having  realized  that  Brazil  was  both  willing  and  able  to  use  litigation  to  its  advantage,  and  using  domestic  reform  to  increase  its  room  to  maneuver,  the  EU  began  to  soften   its  position   in  August  2003,   joining   the  US   in   launching  a  proposal   to  eliminate  export  subsidies  of  particular  interest  to  developing  countries.    The  proposal  prompted  an  immediate  response  from  what  became  known  as  the  G20  group  of  developing  countries.11  The  G20  presented  a  framework  proposal  for  directing  agricultural   negotiations,   proposing   a   number   of   drastic   measures   such   as   the  abolishment  of  the  blue  box,  a  tighter  discipline  of  the  green  box  and  the  elimination  of  export  subsidies  for  all  products.    As   the   September   2003  ministerial   in   Cancun   ended   in   failure,   the  G20  made   clear  that  it  was  in  a  position  to  extract  substantial  concessions  from  the  EU,  and  did  not  want  to  approve  an  extension  of  the  ‘peace  clause’  (Agra  Europe  8  August  2003).  As  a  result,  the  EU  made  a  further  step  in  negotiation  by  putting  export  subsidies  on  the  negotiating  table.  In  May  2004,  in  an  attempt  to  re-­‐launch  negotiations,  the  EU  made  itself  available  to   discuss   a   complete   phasing   out   of   export   subsidies   (European   Commission   2004;  WTO  2004a).  This  decision  was  largely  motivated  by  a  desire  to  forestall  being  forced  to  dismantle  these  instruments  as  a  result  of  legal  rulings,  which  the  EU  feared  in  the  wake  of  the  sugar  case.12    The  deal  on  export   subsidies  was  greeted  by   the  Brazilian  government  as   a  victory  that  would  entail  significant  cost  reductions  for  the  domestic  agricultural  industry,  while  serving   as   the   beginning   of   the   end   of   agricultural   subsidies   (Agra   Europe,   6   August  2004).  Meanwhile,   the   EU  had   started   an   internal   discussion   about   how   to   change   its  sugar   regime   to   implement   the  WTO  ruling,  which  culminated   in  a   reform  adopted  by  the   Council   of   Agricultural   Ministers   in   November   2005   that   allowed   the   EU   to  substantially   comply   with   the   far-­‐reaching   requirements   of   the  WTO   (Daugbjerg   and  Swinbank  2008).  The  EU’s  willingness  to  comply  with  the  WTO  ruling  against  it  on  sugar  subsidies  allowed  Brazil  to  update  its  beliefs  about  the  EU’s  type:  its  compliance  on  one  issue  suggests  that  it  would  be  more  likely  to  comply  on  related  issues.  In  terms  of  the  
                                                
10 Authors’ interview with DG Trade Official at the European Commission, Brussels, 23 February 2009 confirms 
this point.  
11 In the months preceding the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun in September 2003, Brazil had 
undertaken a shift in strategy to increase pressure for agriculture liberalization. While remaining a member of  
the Cairns Group, Brazil led the G20, an issue-based developing countries’ coalition aimed at bargaining jointly 
during the Ministerial Conference and beyond. 
12 Authors’ interview with former DG Agriculture Official at the European Commission, Brussels, 25 June 2010 
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model,  following  EU  compliance  with  WTO  rules  on  sugar  subsidies,  Brazil  expected  p  to  be  higher,  and  thus  believed  that  it  could  demand  more.13  Indeed,  in  2005,  Brazil  sought  to  extract   significant   concessions  on  market  access  and  domestic   support   (G20  2005).  However,   the   Fischler   reforms   had   reduced   the   scope   of   issues   on   which   the   EU  remained  legally  vulnerable:  Brazil  would  be  able  to  extract  additional  concessions  from  the  EU,  but  only  within  the  parameters  of  the  Fischler  reforms.  Among  those  issues  that  remained   legally   vulnerable,   Brazil   and   the   G20   were   able   to   gain   significant  concessions.  On  domestic  support,  in  Hong  Kong,  the  G20  asked  for  a  reduction  of  both  AMS  and  overall  trade  distorting  support  by  80%,  while  the  EU  made  itself  available  to  cut  both  by  70%.  On  market  access,   the  G20  had  asked  for  a  75%  reduction  of  highest  tariffs,  while  the  EU  offered  a  maximum  cut  of  60%,  an  average  cut  of  46%  coupled  with  a   request   to   be   able   to   designate   8%   of   tariff   lines   as   sensitive.   Further   convergence  could   be   achieved   at   the   subsequent   July   2006   Ministerial   in   Geneva,   when   the   EU  improved  its  offer  on  market  access,  getting  close  to  tariff  reductions  demanded  by  the  G20   group   (an   average   tariff   cut   by   54%)   and   lowering   its   demands   on   sensitive  products  to  5%  (Blustein  2009).  While  in  Hong  Kong,  the  two  sides  were  still  somewhat  remote   from   each   other,   but   by   the   July   2006   Ministerial   in   Geneva,   EU   Trade  Commissioner  Mandelson  positioned  himself   as  an  ally  of   the  G20,   and  Brazil  de   facto  accepted  the  reality  that  the  concessions  it  had  extracted  on  issues  on  which  the  EU  was  legally   vulnerable-­‐-­‐-­‐namely,   export   subsidies   and  domestic   support-­‐-­‐-­‐were   a   sufficient  basis  for  a  deal  (Agra  Europe,  28  July  2006;  Blustein  2009).    Although   a   deal   could   not   be   struck   in   Geneva   –   mostly   as   a   result   of   the   US  inflexibility   in   both   asking   for   greater   market   access   concessions   from   the   EU,   and  refusing  to  meet  EU  demands  for  greater  domestic  support  reductions,  Brazil  continued  to   strive   for   a   negotiated   compromise   with   the   EU   in   the   Doha   round,   rather   than  shifting  to  a  litigation.  Although  its  updated  beliefs  about  the  EU  suggested  an  increased  likelihood   of   compliance,   some   fears   remained   that   powerful   farm   lobbies   in   the   EU  might  encourage  a  less  compliant  attitude,  were  Brazil  to  litigate  (Camargo  2008).    Further  developments   in  negotiations   corroborate   the   claim   that   the  parameters  of  an  eventual  compromise  had  been  already  identified.  Indeed,  in  the  last  document  that  sets  the  limits  of  a  potential  compromise  of  agricultural  negotiations,  the  Revised  Draft  Modalities  for  Agriculture  of  December  2008,  the  figures  were  roughly  similar  to  those  identified   in   the   July   2006  Ministerial,   namely   an   average   tariff   cut   by   54%  with   the  possibility  to  designate  4%  of  tariff  lines  as  sensitive  products,  a  70%  reduction  of  AMS  and  an  80%  reduction  of  overall  trade  distorting  support  (WTO  2008).  The  prospects   for  a  successful  conclusion  of   the  Doha  round  have  been  bleak,   if  not  non-­‐existent,   since  2008.  The  narrative  developed  so   far  however,   shows   that   the   two  sides   have   been   able   to  move   closer   to   each   other   throughout   negotiations,   and   that,  both   in   terms   of   content   and   timing,   such   convergence   was   largely   due   to   legal  vulnerability.  While  an  agreement  on  further  liberalization  of  agricultural  trade  may  not  reach  implementation  due  to  the  impossibility  of   finding  a  common  ground  among  the  positions  of  all  negotiating  partners,  it  is  clear  that  legal  vulnerability  acted  as  a  trigger  to   increase   the   set   of   agreements   acceptable   to   both   the   EU   and   Brazil   concerning  
                                                
13 The EU’s compliance with the sugar ruling affected Brazil’s posterior belief about its likelihood of compliance 
in subsequent disputes. However, this outcome did not lead Brazil to believe that the EU would comply with 
certainty. Thus, a litigation strategy still would have entailed a risk of non-compliance, and negotiation remained 
optimal for Brazil. 
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agriculture.  Had  Brazil  been  unable  to  litigate,  it  is  unlikely  that  any  mutually  acceptable  agreements  would  have  existed.      
3.2  Agriculture  negotiations  and  the  pending  expiration  of  the  peace  clause:  the  US  and  Brazil  Much   like   the   EU   position   on   agriculture,   the   US   position   in   the   Doha   Round’s  agricultural  negotiations  was  an  attempt  to  strike  a  delicate  balance  between  significant  pressure   from  Congress   to  protect   farm  subsidies  and   the  constraints  of  a   judicialized  WTO.  A  variety  of  analyses  have  demonstrated   that,  as   in   the  EU  case,  a  wide  array  of  domestic  support  schemes  for  farmers  in  the  US  would  likely  become  challengeable  by  third   parties   in   the  WTO   after   the   expiration   of   the   peace   clause   (Josling,   et   al.   2006;  Kennedy  2008;  Porterfield  2006;  Steinberg  and  Josling  2003;  Sumner  2005).  Consistent  with   our   expectations,   the   US   negotiating   strategy   was   largely   affected   by   legal  vulnerability.      With  the  approval  of  the  1996  Farm  Bill,  agricultural  domestic  support  schemes  were  transformed   by   eliminating   deficiency   payments   and   replacing   them  with   production  flexibility  contract  (PFC)  payments,  fixed  payments  that  would  gradually  decrease  over  a  period  of  seven  years.  While  the  United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  projected  that  this  new  approach  to  farm  subsidies  would  keep  the  United  States  far  below  the  $19.1  billion  URAA  limit,   these  estimates  proved   inaccurate.   Indeed,  when  commodity  prices  collapsed  in  the  late  1990s,  Congress  responded  with  a  series  of  supplemental  bills  that  provided  market   loss  assistance  payments   to  producers  of   the  same  commodities   that  were  eligible  for  PFC  payments  (Porterfield  2006).    Agricultural  domestic   support   schemes  were   further   increased  with   the  2002  Farm  Bill,   permitting   spending   to   increase   by   about   $8   billion   per   year   above   the   levels  projected   by   the   1996   Farm   Bill   and   institutionalizing   additional   payments   tied   to  commodity  prices,  thus  creating  larger  production  incentives  (Sumner  2005).  The  2002  Farm  Bill  established  that   the  bulk  of  US  subsidies  would  be  provided  through  market  loan  program  payments,  direct  payments,  and  countercyclical  payments.  Under   both   bills,   US   domestic   farm   subsidies   were   vulnerable   to   WTO   legal  challenges.   Moreover,   the   famous  WTO   ruling   on   US   cotton   subsidies   clearly   showed  that,  with  respect  to  the  1996  Farm  Bill,   the  US  was  contravening  WTO  rules.   In  2002,  Brazil  initiated  a  WTO  dispute  against  the  US  involving  several  substantive  challenges  to  US  cotton  support  programs  enacted  between  1999  and  2002  (WTO  2002a).  After  two  years  of  consultations,  filings  and  panel  meetings  with  the  parties,  a  WTO  panel  decision  released  in  September  2004  and  an  Appellate  Body  ruling  in  2005  upheld  Brazil’s  claims  (WTO   2004b,   2005a).   The   dispute   settlement   panel   and   Appellate   Body   found   that  certain  programs  the  US  claimed  were  WTO  compatible  green-­‐box  subsidies  (production  flexibility   contract   payments   and   direct   payments)   were   more   than   minimally   trade  distorting,  and  the  US  was  found  to  exceed  the  $19.1  billion  cap  on  permissible  amber-­‐box   support.   For   this   reason,  US  policy  was   ruled   to  have   caused  prejudice   to  Brazil’s  interests   by   causing   significant   price   suppression   in   the   world   market   for   cotton  (Sumner   2005).   Notably,   the   United   States   declined   to   comply   with   the   WTO   ruling,  eventually  allowing  Brazil  to  impose  sanctions.  Ultimately,  the  dispute  was  not  resolved  until  2010  when,  following  a  number  of  compliance  complaints  by  Brazil,  the  two  parties  agreed  on  a  negotiated  settlement  of  the  controversy  (USTR  2010).  Interestingly   for   our   analysis,   this   case   can   be   considered   as   the   first   ‘post-­‐peace  clause’   challenge   to   farm   subsidies   (Josling,   et   al.   2006).      Under   the   standards  established   in   the   cotton   case,   it   became   clear   that   a   wide   array   of   farm   subsidies  
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provided   under   the   2002   Farm   Bill   would   also   be   vulnerable   to   legal   challenges.   A  variety  of  legal  and  economic  analyses  have  noted  that,  on  the  basis  of  the  standards  set  in   the   cotton   case,   policy   tools   created   by   the   2002   Farm  Bill   such   as  marketing   loan  program  payments,  counter-­‐cyclical  payments,  and,   to  a   lesser  extent,  direct  payments  could  also  become  challengeable  under  the  SCM  Agreement  on  grounds  that  they  cause  serious   prejudice   to   foreign   competitors   in   the   US   domestic   or   international  markets  (Schnepf  and  Womach  2007;  Steinberg  and  Josling  2003).14  That  the  cotton  ruling  would  open  up  the  possibility  to  challenge  a  wide  array  of  US  domestic  farm  subsidies  was  clear  to  relevant  actors  in  both  the  US  and  Brazil.  In  2003,  the   President   of   the   American   Farm   Bureau   Federation,   Bob   Stallman,   expressed  concern  that  the  US  could  face  further  challenges,  leading  him  to  support  an  extension  of  the  peace  clause  (Inside  US  Trade,  15  August  2003).  After  the  issuing  of  the  AB  ruling  in  2005,   US   Agriculture   Secretary   Johanns   noted   that   ‘the   US   has   two   choices:   it   can   sit  back  and  watch  as  our  farm  policy  is  disassembled  piece  by  piece,  or  begin  WTO  talks  on  a   new   policy   that   would   provide   a   safety   net   for   US   producers’   (Inside   US   Trade,   7  October   2005).   After   the   2006   Geneva   WTO   Ministerial   Meeting   failure,   both   the   US  Trade  Representative  Susan  Schwab  and  Agriculture  Secretary  Johanns  again  expressed  their   concerns,   claiming   to   expect   an   upsurge   in   legal   challenges   against   US   farm  programs  (Inside  US  Trade,  24  July  2006).  Brazil’s  government  was  obviously  also  aware  of   this  situation  and,  as  a  result,  was  keen  on  conveying  the  message  that  WTO  litigation  was  a  credible  and  powerful  weapon  at  its  disposal.  After  the  adoption  of  the  2005  Appellate  Body  ruling,  Pedro  Camargo,  the  former   Brazilian   Secretary   of   Production   and   Trade   in   the   Ministry   of   Agriculture,  forcefully  stressed  the  link  between  the  cotton  case  and  other  potential  cases  against  US  farm  subsidies  when,  in  the  face  of  a  US  refusal  to  implement  the  WTO  ruling,  he  argued  that   ‘the  dispute  settlement  system  will  again  have   to  produce  essential   jurisprudence  on   levels  of   trade-­‐distorting  support  acceptable   in   international   competition.  Potential  cases  on  rice,  wheat  or  dairy  would  also  have  to  go  this  route’  (Camargo  2005:4).    In   this   context,   and   consistent   with   our   model’s   predictions,   the   US   considered  multilateral   trade   negotiations   as   the   best   venue   to   deal   with   its   legally   vulnerable  agricultural   trade-­‐distorting  policies.  First,   the  most  visible  effect  of   the  cotton  dispute  on  the  Doha  talks  was  the  US  agreement  in  August  2004  to  begin  negotiations  on  the  so-­‐called   ‘Cotton   Initiative’,   a   proposal   by   a   group   of   least-­‐developed   cotton   exporting  countries   (Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Chad  and  Mali)   to  deal  with  questions   such  as   cutting  cotton   subsidies   and   tariffs   and   assisting   farm   productivity   growth   in   Africa.   The  initiative  led  to  two  significant  commitments  by  developed  countries  in  the  Hong  Kong  WTO   Ministerial   Conference   in   2005:   to   eliminate   all   forms   of   export   subsidies   for  cotton  in  2006,  and  to  provide  duty-­‐free  and  quota-­‐free  access  for  cotton  exports  from  least-­‐developed  countries  (WTO  2005b).  These  concessions  were,  of  course,  conditional  on  the  successful  conclusion  of  the  Doha  round.  Second,   and   more   generally,   the   US   conceived   of   multilateral   negotiations   as   an  opportunity  to  engage  in  trade-­‐off  deals  that  would  allow  it  to  minimize  concessions  on  legally   vulnerable   policies   while   simultaneously   pushing   its   offensive   interests.   More  specifically,   since   the   initiation   of   the   so-­‐called   ‘upland   cotton   dispute’   by   Brazil,   the  United   States   has   attempted   to   protect   farm   subsidy   programs   by   linking   limited  concessions   regarding   permissible   levels   and   classifications   of   subsidies   under   the  
                                                
14 It is estimated that most vulnerable programs were those for the following commodities: corn, wheat, rice, 
feed grains, corn, oilseeds.   
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Agreement   on   Agriculture   to   counter-­‐concessions   on  market   access,   while   securing   a  new   Peace   Clause   that   would   limit   challenges   to   farm   subsidies   under   the   SCM  Agreement   (Porterfield   2006).   For   instance,   the   July   2003   joint   EU-­‐US   proposal  preceding  the  Cancun  Ministerial  Conference  called  for  an  expansion  of  the  scope  of  the  blue   box   so   as   to   enable   the   US   to   shift   some   of   its   previously-­‐labeled   amber   box  spending  into  the  blue  box  (Kerremans  2004).  Moreover,  in  successive  proposals  the  US  took   a   strong   position   on   market   access   while   seeking   to   minimize   concessions   on  domestic  support.  The  proposal  presented  by  the  US   in  October  2005   in   the  run-­‐up  to  the  December  Hong  Kong  WTO  Ministerial  Conference  included  bold  requests  on  market  access  such  as  a  cut  of  90%  in  the  highest  agricultural  tariffs  and  limiting  the  number  of  ‘sensitive  products’  to  1%  of  tariff  lines.  Yet,  the  proposal  was  very  timid  regarding  the  domestic   support   pillar,   where   it   offered   to   cut   its   AMS   spending   by   60%   and   its   de  
minimis   spending   by   50%.   These   concessions   in   the   US’   plans   would   be   enabled   by  shifting  most   of   previously-­‐labeled   amber  box   support   into  WTO   compatible   blue  box  (USTR  2005).    Brazil   did  not   passively   accept   the   terms  of  negotiations  offered  by   the  US.   Indeed,  Brazil   fought   hard   to   resist   the   US   strategy   of   shifting   trade-­‐distorting   and   legally-­‐vulnerable   domestic   farm   subsidies   into   WTO-­‐compatible   spending.   Moreover,   while  siding  with   the  US   in   its   requests   for   large   cuts   in  agricultural   tariffs,  Brazil   sought   to  push   the   US   toward   greater   concessions   with   respect   to   the   actual   percentage  reductions  in  domestic  support  (G20  2005).  However,  despite  the  limited  concessions  it  was  able  to  extract  on  domestic  support,  Brazil  continued  to  deem  WTO  multilateral  negotiations  the  best  venue  to  deal  with  US  domestic   farm  subsidies,   rather   than  making  use  of   the  available  strategy  of   litigation.  The   reason   for   this   was   likely   linked   to   the   United   States’   aforementioned  noncompliance  on  the  cotton   issue.  Observing  the  Americans’  unwillingness   to  comply  with   previous  WTO   rulings,   Brazil   updated   its   beliefs   about   the   US   type,   leading   to   a  smaller  value  of  p,  in  model  terms.  Thus,  Brazil  was  ready  to  accept  a  smaller  negotiated  settlement,  rather  than  risk  litigating  against  a  noncompliant  trading  partner.  Indeed,  in  2002,  immediately  after  filing  the  complaint  on  US  cotton  subsidies,  Brazil’s  government  explicated  that    [t]he  threat  of  new  subsidies  cases  after  the  expiration  of  the  peace  clause  would  eventually   serve   as   an   incentive   for   members   to   agree   to   new   reductions   in  domestic   subsidies   and   agricultural   tariffs.   Even   a   deal   that   is   not   exactly   what  Brazil  wants  would  ward  off  subsidies  cases  since  such  a  deal  would  be  preferable  to  a  series  of  disputes  (Inside  US  Trade,  1  November  2002).      Even  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2005  Appellate  Body  ruling  against  the  US,  when  it  was  clear  that  the  concessions  that  could  be  extracted  from  the  US  were  limited,  the  Brazilian  government  reiterated  on  different  occasions  its  preference  for  seeking  convergence  on  domestic  farm  support  rules  in  the  context  of  the  Doha  round,  rather  than  resorting  to  WTO  litigation  (Cairns  Group  2005,  2006,  2007).  For  Brazil  negotiations  in  the  present  were   clearly   preferable   to   litigation   in   the   future   (Camargo   2005),   especially   if   the  ultimate   outcome   of   the   strategy-­‐-­‐-­‐even   if   Brazil   was   victorious   in   litigation-­‐-­‐-­‐was  unclear.    These  reactions  are  very  much  in  line  with  what  our  model  suggests.  As  in  the  case  of  the  challenge  against  EU  sugar  export   subsidies,  Brazil  had  used   the  cotton  dispute   to  
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get  a  better  deal  in  Geneva  negotiations.  Brazilian  officials  however,  knew  that  the  road  toward  implementation  of  the  WTO  ruling  was  loaded  with  political  landmines  because  of  the  tremendous  political  influence  of  farmers  in  the  US  system  and  the  visibility  that  the  cotton  issue  had  acquired  in  the  US  (Goldberg  et  al.  2004).  The  political  resistance  to  the   implementation   of   WTO   rulings   by   the   US   proved   that   these   expectations   were  correct   (see   Schnepf   2011   for   a   timeline),   and   that   the   US   was   relatively   unlikely   to  comply   with   adverse  WTO   rulings.   In   other   words,   the   US   was   perceived   to   be   (and  acted   as)   a   non-­‐compliant   type   of   disputant.   In   this   context,   it   is   not   surprising   that  although   Brazil   could   revert   to   a   credible   strategy   of   litigation   against   the   US,   it  preferred  to  continue  engaging  in  negotiations  that  would  likely  entail  a  small  amount  of  concessions  rather  than  risk  non-­‐compliance  in  litigation.  As   noted   above,   the   Geneva   2006  WTO   Ministerial   Conference   failed   to   identify   a  common   ground   for   compromise.   Among   the  many   contentious   issues   that   remained  unresolved,   the  US   insistence  on   greater  market   access   concessions  by   the  EU  and   its  refusal   to   improve   its   offers   on   domestic   support   stand   out   as   major   bones   of  contention,   and   the   positions   of   the   key   players   did   not   change   substantially   by  December  2008.  The  lack  of  an  actual  agreement  in  agricultural  negotiations,  however,  does  not  run  directly  counter  to  our  argument.  Reaching  an  agreement  would  require  a  compromise  between  all  major  stakeholders  involved  in  the  negotiations  process.  As  for  the  dyadic  relationship  between  the  US  and  Brazil  considered  here,   it  seems  likely  that  the   chance   of   any   overlap   in   the   negotiating   positions   of   the   two   parties  would   have  been   even   less   likely   in   the   absence   of   legal   vulnerability.   Consistent   with   our  expectations,   both   parties   preferred   to   tackle   existing   barriers   trade   that   could   be  challenged   in   the  WTO  DSM   through   negotiations   rather   than   litigation   and   gradually  moved   toward   a   compromise   (though   one   that   entailed   relatively   few   concessions),  eventually  allowing  them  to  minimize  costs  for  the  potential  defendant  and  to  reduce  at  least  some  of  the  costs  incurred  by  exporters  in  the  potential  complainant.    
4.    Conclusion    In   this   article,  we  have   investigated  how   legal   vulnerability   from  extant  WTO   rules  affects   multilateral   trade   negotiations.   We   demonstrated   formally   that   the   ability   to  impose  retaliatory  measures  provides  potential  complainants  with  a  weapon  that   they  can   use   against   trading   partners   who   are   engaging   in   unfair   practices.   The   credible  threat   to   use   this  weapon   can   encourage   concessions   from   otherwise-­‐obstinate   trade  distorters.  Negotiated  agreements  can  be  beneficial  to  both  parties,  as  the  defendant  can  bargain   for   a   smaller   reduction   than   would   be   required   under   an   adverse   judgment,  while  the  complainant  still  gains  relief  for  its  exporters.  As  we  have  shown,  however,  the  complainant’s   beliefs   about   the   defendant’s   willingness   to   comply   with   a   judgment  against   it   matter.   Complainants   are   willing   to   accept   fewer   concessions   from   trading  partners  who  are  likely  to  be  non-­‐compliant.  Empirically,  we  have  illustrated  how  potential  and  actual  legal  challenges  in  the  form  of   WTO   disputes   brought   by   Brazil   against   EU   and   US   trade-­‐distorting   agricultural  subsidies  affected  these  players’  negotiations  for  the  liberalization  of  agricultural  trade  in   the   Doha   round.   In   line  with   our  model,   the   empirical   analysis   shows   that   Brazil’s  ability   to   challenge   trade-­‐distorting  policies  of   its   trading  partners   successfully   and   to  impose  costs  on  them  significantly  affected  the  latter  states’  behavior.  When  Brazil  could  not   credibly   threaten   to   litigate,   neither   the   EU   nor   the   US   was   willing   to   bend   in  
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negotiations;  when  Brazil’s  litigation  threat  became  credible,  both  were  willing  to  offer  concessions   that  would  not  otherwise  have  been  on   the  negotiation   table.   In   line  with  our  model’s   predictions,   the   US  was   able   to   concede   less   than   the   EU,   due   to   Brazil’s  beliefs  about  its  (lack  of)  willingness  to  comply.  One   caveat   associated   with   our   analysis   is   that   the   mechanism   that   we   highlight  assumes  that  the  issue  under  dispute  is  sufficiently  important  to  the  defendant  to  induce  some   non-­‐zero   probability   of   non-­‐compliance.   In   those   cases   in   which   the   costs   of  compliance   are   sufficiently   low  or   broadly   distributed,   compliance  may   be   a   foregone  conclusion,  and  a  complainant  can  simply  opt  for  litigation  with  the  assurance  that  it  will  receive  everything   it  desires.  While   this   limits   the  cases   for  which  we  can  expect   legal  vulnerability   to   increase   the   chances   for   cooperation,   those   that   remain   tend   to   be  among   the   most   relevant   and   important.   Moreover,   while   the   agricultural   cases  considered  here  speak  to  our  theoretical  model  particularly  well,  the    applicability  of  the  argument  is  by  no  means  restricted  to  this  particular  issue  area.  For  instance,  a  similar  logic  may  apply   in   the   case  of   the  Doha  Round  negotiations   concerning  WTO  rules  on  antidumping,  as  the  initiation  of  litigation  by  the  EU,  Japan,  and  Korea  over  the  US’s  so-­‐called  “zeroing”  practice   for  counting  dumping  margins  also  seems  to  have  triggered  a  willingness  on  both  sides  to  pursue  a  negotiated  settlement.  Our  findings  have  important  implications  for  the  study  on  the  effects  of  international  trade   institutions  on  preference   formation  and   state  behavior   in  WTO  member   states.  First,  our  analysis  advances  the  debate  on  the  conditions  for  international  cooperation.  The  conventional  wisdom  posits  that  the  odds  of  defection  from  cooperation  are  greater  when  actors  engage  in  negotiations  concerning  prospective  agreements  that  they  expect  to   be   highly   enforceable   (Fearon   1998;   Koremenos   et   al.   2001).   In   line   with   this  argument,   some   have   suggested   that   increased   enforceability   of   rules   may   end   up  endangering   the   stability  of   the  world   trading   system  by  decreasing   the  propensity  of  WTO  members   to   further   commit   to   trade   liberalization   (Goldstein   and  Martin  2000).  This  analysis  may  well  be  correct.  The  opposition  of  key  WTO  players  to  the  expansion  of  WTO’s  regulatory  reach  to  a  host  of  areas  such  as   labor  standards  and  the  so-­‐called  Singapore   issues,   as   well   as   other   members’   reluctance   to   deepen   existing   trade  liberalization  commitments  indeed  seem  to  support  the  view  that  stronger  enforcement  of  rules  may  deter  cooperation  in  the  trade  regime.  Our  analysis,  however,  complements  this   argument   in   an   important   way.   While   judicialization   may   well   have   increased  members’  reluctance  to  commit  to  binding  agreements  in  new  areas,  judicialization  also  may  increase  members’  willingness  to  deepen  already  existing  commitments  when  these  members   negotiate   under   the   shadow   of   WTO   law.   This   has   important   real-­‐world  implications.  So  far,  observers  and  analysts  have  concurred  in  stressing  that  the  DSM  is  efficient  because  more  trade  disputes  get  resolved  and  compliance  with  WTO  rules  has  been  strengthened  (Zangl  2008).  Our  analysis  shows  that  the  DSM  may  be  efficient  in  an  even  more  fundamental  way.  Not  only  can  more  disputes  get  resolved,  but  the  threat  or  the  actual  use  of  a  litigation  strategy  may  ignite  a  dynamic  of  cooperation  when  existing  commitments  cast  the  shadow  of  WTO-­‐law  incompatibility.  This  statement  may  initially  seem   at   odds  with   the   current   stalemate   of   Doha   negotiations.  However,   our   analysis  suggests   that   the  prospects   for  a  negotiated  agreement  –  already  very  slim  because  of  the  rise  of  Brazil  and  India,  the  deteriorating  trade  position  of  the  US  and  the  EU,  and  the  complex  nature  of  negotiating   regulatory   issues  –  would  have  been  even   less   likely   in  the  absence  of  the  shadow  of  WTO  law.  
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Second,   in   addition   to   showing   that  bargaining  under   the   shadow  of  WTO   law  may  enhance  the  prospects  for  a  negotiated  agreement,  our  argument  speaks  to  the  question  of   actors’   bargaining   power.  We   show   that   disregarding  WTO   rulings   as   a   defendant  enhances   the   credibility   of   non-­‐compliance   threats,   ultimately   improving   the  defendant’s  bargaining  position  when  trying  to  come  to  a  negotiated  settlement.    Finally,   our   analysis   suggests   an   easily   expandable   research   program.   Besides  assessing  the  explanatory  power  of  our  argument  in  other  areas  of  negotiations,  future  research   could   further  develop  our   argument   along   comparative   lines.   For   instance,   it  seems  plausible   to   expect   the  nature   of   the   issue   at   stake   to   determine  whether   legal  vulnerability  can  trigger  this  positive  dynamic  of  cooperation.  A  necessary  condition  for  our  argument  to  hold  is  thus  that  the  issue  at  stake  be  divisible,  as  it  would  allow  such  a  middle-­‐ground   compromise   to   be   reached.   Further   research   could   thus   investigate  whether  legal  vulnerability  plays  out  differently  across  issue  areas,  comparing  its  effects  when   relatively   continuous   issues   are   at   stake   (e.g.,   tariffs,   nonzero   quotas,   and  subsidies),   and   when   more   discrete   issues   are   at   stake   (e.g.,   health   and   safety  regulations,   product   classification   issues,   and   bans).   Such   research   would   greatly  improve  our  understanding  of  negotiating  behavior  in  the  shadow  of  WTO  law.        
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